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Forged in Fire: The Echoing Legacy of Measures of Risk in the OSS

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Dedication

For the ones who taught me to do the impossible—my parents, and for my “Glorious
Amateur” and best friend, Chris

Abstract

Forged in Fire: The Echoing Legacy of Measures of Risk in the OSS

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The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's first intelligence agency, was born in the extreme context of war. The legacy of the OSS inherited by the CIA can result in mistakes from wartime risk in peacetime action, as well as independence and creativity that can produce the greatest success. In undertaking missions to achieve the impossible, innovative individuals developed creative solutions to gather information and accomplish missions to provide Allied policy makers with the edge they needed to win the war. This paper evaluates individuals and cases to identify how risk was measured and undertaken in wartime in order to understand its impact on organizations in a time of peace.

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INTRODUCTION

“Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. – William Donovan”¹

The OSS left a legacy that would become the foundation of the CIA and Special Forces. OSS was born in the extreme circumstances of global war and staffed by “Glorious Amateurs.” This context contributed to the organization’s willingness to innovate and to accept risk. The defining characteristics of the individuals who shaped the OSS and the way they evaluated risk would define the legacy inherited by the CIA, and are essential to replicating this success. This report aims to answer the major questions diagrammed below.




Figure 1.1: Primary Report Questions

Chapter 1: Process Mapping

This report uses process mapping as a tool to understand lessons from the case studies and the major personalities involved at different levels within the institutional hierarchy of the OSS. Intentionally asking broad questions regarding various elements of OSS operational methods allows this paper to explore what the success of individual operators taught senior officers at the highest levels of the OSS planning process, and how those lessons translated into the cornerstones of operational procedure. Cases and individuals were chosen intentionally to utilize individual illustrations to describe the decision-making process and structure of the OSS as a whole.

Each case opens with an overview of the operation, followed by a discussion of the major personalities and interpersonal dynamics involved in the operation. The cases are then analyzed in four categories: context, success, reward, and impact, through the questions outlined in Figure 1.2 below.




Figure 1.2: Primary Case Study Questions.

Analyzing the process from the overview at the highest levels of administrative planning to the focused perspective of individual operators provides a comprehensive examination of OSS measures of risk and success. This allows for deeper examinations of long-term implications. Also, by analyzing the results of innovation, one can identify trends applicable today.

¹ “Coordinator of Information, 1941.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The President's Secretary's File (PSF), 1933-1945. Box 128, Primary Document, 3.

Chapter 2: The Beginnings of the OSS

COI and the Birth of the OSS

“Into the breach rushed OSS”—R. Harris Smith²

President Roosevelt appointed William Donovan as the Coordinator of Information (COI) on July 1th, 1941, to act as the head of an information gathering civilian office, reporting directly to the White House.³ Thomas Troy, a historian of the COI, described it as follows, “a novel attempt in American history to organize research, intelligence, propaganda, subversion, and commando operations as a unified and essential feature of modern warfare; a ‘Fourth Arm’ of the military services.”⁴

The success of the COI ultimately led to its division. Donovan’s thorough recruiting process to find the best staff with experience and cultural understanding led to quick success. His 10 million dollar budget did not hurt either.⁵ The ranks of his office soon rose to 600 staffers, and Donovan’s opponents’ distrust of the COI grew with it, especially from the FBI.⁶ In a skillful effort of diplomacy, Donovan and the Joint Chiefs negotiated a plan that would split the COI down the lines of “black” and “white” propaganda missions.⁷ Thus the War Office gained control of the attributable, “white” propaganda, and COI Foreign Information Service was rebranded as the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), overseeing radio broadcasting and additional “black” propaganda missions.⁸ This deal served to officially establish the OSS position within the wartime apparatus and create connections to military support and resources, “JCS 155/2/D officially made OSS the military’s psychological warfare agency, which meant Donovan would be supplied with military manpower for his otherwise civilian agency.”⁹ The new arrangement also served to clearly define the scope of the mission of the OSS,

and to clearly separate it from the highest levels of military information and domestic counterintelligence.¹⁰ More of Donovan's vision for this organization can be seen in his proposal in Appendix A at the end of this report.

Donovan realized his organization would have to establish its relevance and ability to contribute to the Allied war-effort based on its own ability to gather and analyze intelligence. He immediately dispatched agents to missions and countries around the globe. This organization that started with one man would grow to almost 13,000 men and women at its peak, and it would spend approximately 135 million dollars in its four-year life span, the equivalent of 1.1 billion dollars today.¹¹ The peak of the OSS is reflected in the organizational chart of Figure 1.3 below.




Figure 1.3: OSS Organization at its Peak¹²

Recruiting Donovan's Dreamers

"They also held a basic faith in human progress and the ability of 'common men' to improve the world through a common effort."—R. Harris Smith¹³

The success of the OSS was a result of the people who worked there. Often they were the men and women who did not always fit into traditional warfare. The original recruits who found their way into the COI were those with the expertise immediately needed, whether that was knowledge of countries, culture, climate, terrain, politics or industry.¹⁴ A report from OSS psychological staff noted, "OSS undertook and carried out more different types of enterprises calling for more varied skills than any other single organization of its size in the history of our country."¹⁵

Donovan's hope for OSS officers was that they would be "calculatingly reckless" with "disciplined daring" and "trained for aggressive action."¹⁶ These operators were considered to be the best of the best, referred to by many as the "Glorious Amateurs." "Two-thirds of OSS personnel came out of the military, among them highly qualified volunteers for risky, unconventional missions not further described. The rest of the workforce was civilian and included many of the most prominent academics in America."¹⁷

These individuals would need to operate independently, and often without a plan in dangerous situation. They had no playbook to follow; every mission would be unique. They would have to define risk, define success, and act accordingly.

What Lessons did the OSS Learn? Standard Operating Procedures

“At its best, OSS training produced officers who were fit and confident, able to think for themselves and act decisively under enormous stress.”—Center for the Study of Intelligence¹⁸

As an organization growing from nothing, the OSS had to create standard operating procedures and training programs, “Quickly improvised to meet wartime needs, training in the OSS was forever in a state of flux and change. It could at one and the same time, seem haphazard and deadly serious.”¹⁹ As this report looked for standard operating procedures within the OSS, they were difficult to find, “Standard operating procedures were almost taboo in OSS. Effective action was the sole objective.” While effective action was quintessential to OSS success, it was not always efficient, “Inevitably, activism also meant waste. Donovan procured for OSS an unlimited (and largely unvouchered) budget that ran into the hundreds of millions during the four years of the war.”²⁰ But because the OSS had such a unique mission, the name of the game was trial and error; it is not fair to classify this spending as wasteful.²¹

Donovan himself spoke out against planning on a trip to London, “Gentlemen, I find that here in London you have been doing too much planning. Plans are no good on the day of battle. I ask you to throw your plans out the window.”²² However, this does not mean they were completely unprepared. The OSS functioned with more of a toolkit than an operating manual (though they did have a handbook, Illustration 1.1). By preparing skills to call upon, they allowed for flexibility, as things rarely go as planned. With experience comes knowledge, and as the level of training reflected that, “Others remembered it as physically challenging and surprisingly professional, especially toward the end of the war, when it reflected lessons learned from the field and increasing

standardization.”²³ Along these lines, this report will explore how the OSS understood risk and viewed success in an effort to establish a baseline for lessons learned.



Illustration 1.1: OSS Handbook²⁴

Context and Knowledge

*“Intelligence is an activity which consists, essentially, of three functions. Information has to be acquired; it has to be analyzed and interpreted; and it has to be put into the hands of those who can use it.”- F.H. Hinsley, author of British Intelligence in the Second World War.*²⁵

The OSS was born in a time of war. At odds with every other organization and department, OSS operated in the moment with a freedom that some considered reckless,

but could only stem from rapid decision-making and goal-oriented creativity. Most of its competitors had spent years developing best practices and contacts. Starting at such a deficit, the OSS needed to gain ground quickly if they were to provide Allied policy makers with information resulting in a decision advantage.

Risk in an extreme context is very different than that of peace. In war, the consequences of inaction are greater, often eclipsing the risks of failure:

“The chaotic administration of a dynamic, unimaginable wartime secret service proved dangerous in an era of uneasy peace. During a World War, Donovan had felt, justifiably, that the smallest success would probably outweigh the greatest blunder. In the nuclear age, the most minute blunder—a reconnaissance flight detected or an espionage operation ‘blown’—could lead to irreparable disaster.”²⁶

Intelligence collection would be needed after the war, and the OSS would leave its mark on it. During war, failure is accepted as less of a risk, “But America was locked in a war for its very survival, and R&D chief Stanley Lovell felt that no idea could be overlooked: ‘It was my policy to consider any method whatever that might aid the war, however unorthodox or untried.’ Failures were accepted as a cost of doing business.”²⁷ In peacetime, the perception of failure can be very different. This report will evaluate the extreme context through the case studies in an effort to understand this impact.

The OSS Today

The strength of the OSS was not only in having smart people, but having people who are passionate, and willing to lay their lives on the line again. The legacy of the OSS is clearly seen within the CIA Credo in Appendix E, and the description of courage in the CIA Ethos, “We accomplish difficult, high-stakes, often dangerous tasks. In executing mission, we carefully manage risk but we do not shy away from it. We value sacrifice and honor our fallen.”²⁸

A Profile: William “Wild Bill” Donovan

*“General Donovan possessed the ‘power to visualize an oak when he saw an acorn,’”—
OSS Psychological Staff²⁹*



Illustration 2.1: Picture of William Donovan³⁰

While General Donovan is not completely responsible for the culture of the OSS, his impact cannot be overstated. As the OSS was his and President Roosevelt's brainchild, he was involved from the beginning, seeing it through until Truman disbanded it after the war's end. He knew that his civilian agency would need to operate differently from military intelligence organizations. He gave his men the freedom to do so, "In every case, Donovan supported his officers. He had given his men their freedom of action and he would not allow them to be punished for exercising it with enthusiasm."³¹

Donovan was responsible for the overarching strategy of the OSS, but he was also known for visiting his men and missions in the field. One anecdote that exemplifies Donovan was his involvement in the invasion of Normandy. Expressly forbidden to join the invasion force as he knew too much about American intelligence operations, he appealed the decision, and when rejected again, he found his way ashore with the invasion through "other devious means."³² He told Colonel David Bruce, who travelled to the front with him, "You and I are old and expendable. What better end for us than to die in Normandy with enemy bullets in our bellies?"³³ When he received an injury near his jugular vein in his neck, he kept advancing, looking for the agents he hoped to rendezvous with. When he and Bruce became pinned down by enemy machine-gun fire, Bruce recounts the following exchange:

"Flattened out, the general turned to me and said: 'David we mustn't be captured, we know too much.' 'Yes, Sir,' I answered mechanically. 'Have you your pill?' he demanded. I confessed I was not carrying the instantaneous death pellet concocted by our scientific adviser... 'Never mind,' replied the resourceful general, 'I have two of them.' Thereupon still lying prone, he disgorged the contents of all his pockets. There were a number of hotel keys, a passport, currency of several nationalities, photographs of grandchildren, travel orders, newspaper clippings, and heaven knows what else, but no pills. 'Never mind,' said Donovan, 'we can do without them, but if we get out of here, you must send a message to Gibbs, the Hall Porter at Claridges in London, telling him on no account to allow servants in the hotel to touch some dangerous medicines in my

bathroom.””

“This humanitarian disposition having been made... Donovan whispered to me: ‘I must shoot first.’ Yes, Sir,’ I responded, ‘but can we do much against machine-guns with our pistols?’ ‘Oh, you don’t understand,’ he said. ‘I mean if we are about to be captured I’ll shoot you first. After all, I am your Commanding Officer.’”³⁴

Both men survived this encounter, and luckily no pills or bullets were needed for such an untimely end. But this anecdote represents the fearlessness (which some may consider carelessness) that Donovan embodied, and that his men imitated. His determination would serve him and the OSS well. He wore what must have been very heavy mantels of mastermind and inspiration for the OSS. DCI William Webster said of Donovan when dedicating a statue of him,

"To those of us here today, this is General Donovan's greatest legacy. He realized that a modern intelligence organization must not only provide today's tactical intelligence, it must provide tomorrow's long-term assessments. He recognized that an effective intelligence organization must not allow political pressures to influence its counsel. And, finally, he knew that no intelligence organization can succeed without recognizing the importance of people—people with discretion, ingenuity, loyalty, and a deep sense of responsibility to protect and promote American values."³⁵

Donovan’s role in the context, success, reward, and impact of the OSS echoes in the legacy of OSS today.

² Smith, R. H. “OSS: the secret history of America’s first central intelligence agency.” (Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd, 1972), 25.

³ “The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency” (Central Intelligence Agency: Web, 2017), 3.

⁴ Ibid. 3.

⁵ Ibid. 3.

⁶ Ibid. 4

⁷ Ibid. 4.

⁸ Ibid. 4.

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- ⁹ Todd, A. "Operation Blackmail: one woman's covert war against the Imperial Japanese Army." (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 4.
- ¹⁰ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," Central Intelligence Agency, 4.
- ¹¹ Ibid. 4
- ¹² "OSS Organization (Washington) November 1944." In The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency. (Central Intelligence Agency: Web, 2017) Image.
- ¹³ Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 30.
- ¹⁴ Hymoff, E. "The OSS in World War II." (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1986), 77.
- ¹⁵ Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 25.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. 35
- ¹⁷ Center for the Study for Intelligence. "OSS Exhibition Catalogue." (Central Intelligence Agency: Washington D.C.), 6.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. 10
- ¹⁹ Ibid. 10
- ²⁰ Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 4.
- ²¹ Ibid. 5.
- ²² Ibid. 183.
- ²³ Center for the Study for Intelligence. "OSS Exhibition Catalogue," 10.
- ²⁴ Center for the Study of Intelligence. "OSS Training Manual." (Central Intelligence Agency: Washington D.C.) Image.
- ²⁵ Quote from F.H. Hinsley author of British Intelligence in the Second World War. In Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II." (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 1-2.
- ²⁶ Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 362-363.
- ²⁷ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," 9.
- ²⁸ "CIA Vision, Mission, Ethos & Challenges." (Central Intelligence Agency: 2018. Web).
- ²⁹ OSS Psychological Staff, quoted in Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 19.
- ³⁰ "Major General William J. Donovan led the Office of Strategic Services from 1942-1945." In "Wild Bill" Donovan and the Origins of the OSS. National Archives. Image
- ³¹ Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 6.
- ³² Ibid. 184.
- ³³ Ibid. 184.
- ³⁴ Ibid. 185.
- ³⁵ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," Central Intelligence Agency, 11.

MISSION REVIEW CASE STUDIES

“OSS was expected, much as we are now, to make sense of a world in turmoil and, where possible, to change it for the better. The methods to accomplish that mission were—and still are—as broad as the mission itself... Whatever the means, the goal was always the same: To reach behind the battle lines, either to learn about the enemy or to attack him directly. To strike in any possible way, by giving our fighting forces the advantage of intelligence or by giving resistance movements the advantages of equipment, training, and—most of all—hope.”—A. B. Krongard, Former Executive Director of the CIA³⁶

The following case studies were chosen to reflect different elements of OSS operations. They intentionally represent different levels of risk and action to capture a holistic picture of the operations. The individuals essential to these missions also span different levels of the institutional hierarchy as well.

Chapter 3: Norway

Special Operations Groups (OGs)

“None pretended they could win the cause by themselves, but all committed themselves to provide that extra effort that could ensure the success of the whole strategy.”—William E. Colby³⁷

The major missions in Norway reflect the difficult work of Special Operations Groups (OGs):

“OGs were the ‘infantry of the OSS.’ They were uniformed military personnel formed into hard hitting units that would operate deep behind enemy lines, conducting sabotage upon Axis forces and not necessarily dependent upon the resources of resistance groups already in place. The OGs were trained in parachuting, demolitions, weaponry, commando tactics, communications, amphibious warfare, and skiing.”³⁸

The descendants of this group include today’s U.S. Special Forces and the CIA’s Special Activities Division, among others. The information surrounding OGs was not declassified until 1987, so the majority of the historical analysis is relatively new and has the benefit of hindsight in understanding it.³⁹ Eventually three OGs would be formed; Norwegians, French, and Italians, with two sections per group, consisting of two squads 8 men per section.⁴⁰

The individuals who comprised the OG teams were unbelievably brave, accepting a role considered to be barely a step up from a suicide mission. The soldiers were required to pay off all equipment and all civilian debt before departing, and they were encouraged to review their wills and make other preparations.⁴¹

OG units were different from U.S. Rangers or British Commandos:

“Initially, Commandos and Rangers focused on hit-and-run or smash-and-grab raids aimed at creating maximum damage and confusion in enemy territory for a

short amount of time...The OG and SO teams on the other hand were expected to be efficient, mobile, and self-sufficient units capable of infiltrating deep into enemy territory, making contact with local resistance groups, and converting them into guerrilla units.”⁴²

They endured strength, survival, and first-aid training, as well as in reconnaissance and infiltration.⁴³ They also learned how to travel undetected, using maps, compasses, and terrain features and received mechanical training in case they needed to repair an enemy vehicle while on mission.⁴⁴

Jedburgh Teams

“Surprise, kill, and vanish.”

- Motto of the Jedburgh teams⁴⁵

It is impossible to discuss OG groups without paying homage to the Jedburghs. These were three-men multinational teams, which were sent behind enemy lines in France to support the French resistance. The name Jedburghs replaced the original code-name of “Jumpers,” but why “Jedburghs” was specifically chosen remains and bit of a mystery.⁴⁶

Eighty-three teams parachuted in to integral parts of France in a five-month time span from June to October 1944, comprised of, “286 Jedburghs, 83 Americans, 90 British, 103 French, 5 Belgians, and 5 Dutch.”⁴⁷ Team Hugh was the first sent to France on 5/6 June 1944, and all American and British Jedburghs were recalled on 13 October 1944.⁴⁸ They collected information, and coordinated and trained the French resistance. Their exploits are heroic and extensive, but most relevant for this project, Jedburgh mission also served as a training ground for following OG missions, and especially Operation RYPE that came after.

Building the NORSO Group

“Developed by the American Office of Strategic Services under Major General William J. Donovan, it reflected his conviction that America’s polyglot population stemming from its immigrants was a strength, not a weakness.” - William E. Colby⁴⁹

The 99th Infantry Battalion, constituted on July 10, 1942, would be comprised of 931 enlisted men, intended to be comprised largely of those of Norwegian decent.⁵⁰ The idea stemmed from Donovan’s idea that, “specially trained ethnic units could be used deep behind enemy lines in unconventional roles.”⁵¹ Pulling from Norwegian Nationals fleeing Nazi-controlled Norway, as well as Norwegian Americans. The ability to speak Norwegian was required, though fluency varied.⁵²

Shortly after the establishment of the 99th, OSS recruiting officers arrived, searching for candidates willing to take on “extra-hazardous duty behind enemy lines in Norway.”⁵³ They were specifically to be trained in “airborne operations, amphibious warfare, commando tactics, weapons, demolition, radio communications, jungle-type warfare, skiing, mountain climbing, and would possess language skills appropriate for areas where they would operate.”⁵⁴ After the NORSO group “‘invaded’ Martha’s Vineyard,” for training exercises, they headed to Wales in 1943 to complete their training and await assignment.⁵⁵ After months of waiting for a mission to Norway, the NORSO group would be sent to France.⁵⁶ It would not be until October 1944, that William Colby would take command the NORSO group would be able to turn their attention to Norway.⁵⁷

Operation RYPE

“...if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a knowledge of both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive results.— William Donovan ”⁵⁸



Illustration 4.1: William Colby and the NORSO Group⁵⁹

Colby signed Field Order no. 1, estimating Germans were travelling on a single railroad from North to South, carrying a possible 500 men a day, with garrisons and ammunition along the route.⁶⁰ A drop zone was to be chosen, and the intended target was a section from Lurundal to Formofoss, with a section from Grong to Majavatn as a back-up, and the Grana bridge south of Agle would be added as a primary target.⁶¹ Colby said, “The railroad—the Nordland—a single-track affair between Narvik and Trondheim carried thousands of [German] troops Reichward each day, and daily gained in capacity. Like Carthage, this had to be destroyed.”⁶² It was essential to prevent the return of German troops to the Western front, which would have been devastating to Allied forces.

The first attempt for a drop failed due to weather conditions, this was a stroke of luck because the intended drop had somehow been compromised and German patrols were searching the intended landing area.⁶³ Four out of nine planes successfully dropped personnel and equipment at the RYPE site, where five members of the Norwegian resistance members lit an L-shaped fire to signal the drop zone and met them.⁶⁴ Sixteen men landed on target, but five were dropped accidentally into neutral Sweden, resulting in capture and secret internment.⁶⁵ According to the Center for Intelligence Study, this mission, “...was the first and only combined ski-parachute operation ever mounted by the US Army.”⁶⁶

After reconnaissance, Colby had concerns about the group’s ability to sabotage the target, Grana Bridge, without reinforcements. But when it became clear reinforcements could not come, he wanted to move forward with the plan anyway.⁶⁷ The situation continued to decline, and the mission to attack Grana Bridge was aborted, but it was decided to cause as much damage as possible and to strike a smaller bridge at Tangen.

A Profile: William Colby

“Colby was five feet, eight inches, and 130 pounds of ‘screaming dynamite’”- Lt. Glen Farnsworth⁶⁸



Illustration 4.2: Picture of William Colby⁶⁹

One of the most iconic operators of these missions was William Colby, who would play a major role in the Vietnam war, and ultimately become a Director of Central Intelligence in the 70s.

Ironically, Colby, an Irish Catholic, had no connection to Norway. But he grew up surrounded by Scandinavians, and he was well acquainted with skiing.⁷⁰ He was placed on a Jedburgh team based on his experience with jump school and knowledge of French. He was code-named “Berkshire” on the Jedburgh missions and was only 24 years old.⁷¹ His experience there would lead to his role in NORSO. He led Operation RYPE.

Colby had to determine the targets on the ground based on available resources. Managing his own officers and the resistance members he was working with, as well as minimal radio contact with the base back in London, he had to make decisions independently. His judgment would determine the success and impact of the mission. His ability to lead independently and develop rapid and efficient solutions are prototypical of OSS officers and culture.

Context

“To think that General Eisenhower thought enough of our little village to send an American officer here to help us.”—An eighty-year-old Frenchman to Jedburgh Michael Burke⁷²

Norway was under enemy occupation. Risk/gain analysis within this case must balance the connection of many OGs to Norway and their desire to see it free and the interests of the war as a whole. Therefore, risk to mission is difficult to evaluate in this case. The primary objective had to be defined between freeing Norway from enemy occupation and winning the war. Obviously they often go hand in hand. But the OGs were sent to Norway to prevent German troops from returning to the continent, not

specifically to restore Norway. If that had been the goal, they would have likely been sent much sooner, as the OGs with a heritage connection to Norway had hoped. Risk to mission then became risk to the war, not risk to Norway.

Risk to force was very high in Operation RYPE. As they were sent behind enemy lines, they were constantly at risk of death or capture. They would need to blend in and yet wear their uniforms in case of capture so as to be treated as a POW, and not executed as a spy. Hitler even sent out orders to the German forces that any sort of commando captured was to be shot immediately, even in uniform or surrendering.⁷³ The gain was that such a small force could be as effective, or more effective, than a larger conventional unit under certain circumstances. Ultimately fewer lives would be at risk.

The NORSO group had been unaware that the Reichkommissar, Josef Terboven, had committed to killing ten innocent Norwegians for every German killed by the Norwegian Resistance, and even worse, he was willing to shoot 10,000 Norwegians for every attack on the railway.⁷⁴ As German occupying forces in Norway were committing such atrocities, this partially explains why missions to Norway were chosen so carefully compared to other theaters. The risk to non-combatants was extremely high, and the Allies could not risk losing the support of the Norwegians and the Norwegian resistance. The risk to non-combatants and the mission and morale of the Norwegian resistance required deep consideration from Allied planners. Action in Norway would be avoided until the shift of German divisions toward the continent and Western front met a threshold worthy of that risk.

Success

“But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent upon accurate information.”—William Donovan⁷⁵

Success was a changing metric in Operation RYPE, the targets and situation constantly changed with new information and changing resources. Success in this mission can be summarized as do as much un-attributable damage as possible and to get back safely. Lives were lost in simply delivering OGs to Norway.⁷⁶ They would not all make it back safely, but they would cause damage across the Norwegian rail system and they prevented German soldiers from leaving Norway to other fronts.

Colby and his men received accolades and honors, and despite a few challenges, the mission succeeded, “The 109 double charges destroyed 218 rails, for a distance of two and one-half kilometers. The mission was a complete success.”⁷⁷

Reward

“Clearly the OSS NORSO Group was composed of patriots.”—Bruce H. Heimark⁷⁸

The plan was all action, “We would seize a train, board it, throw her into reverse and blow up every tunnel and bridge we could until ammunition had run out; then drive the train into a ditch. We hoped to succeed by sheer bravado.”⁷⁹ This action was rewarded in Norway, just as it was in France.

Instead of simply waiting, the NORSO group gained valuable experience by joining the Jedburghs as they jumped into France. “The OGs provided the military discipline by example to the Maquis while in field operations. It paid off during the

PATRICK mission when the OGs would not retreat from withering enemy fire, and the Maquis stayed with them.”⁸⁰ The OGs learned how to work with local resistance forces to accomplish strategic goals in France and we see this repeated in Norway.

Operation RYPE also rewarded the loyalty of their resistance compatriots and increased cooperation between them. Colby made an effort to understand the needs of the locals, and even had canned pineapple delivered in a supply drop, as he corrected discerned the pineapple’s role in boosting the morale of the locals.⁸¹ They also learned that they had a significant advantage over German soldiers on skis, and focused their efforts on winter operations, until they eventually had to trade their skis for jeeps.⁸²

Impact

“In this Post-Cold War atmosphere of reshaping international and national affairs to meet the new challenges of a new age, it is highly relevant to review how an earlier generation faced up to and organized itself to meet the challenges of its age.”—

*William E. Colby*⁸³

Ultimately eight attacks on Norwegian railways would take place between April 15 and 28, 1945, preventing 150,000 German soldiers from retreating to the continent and possibly prolonging the war.⁸⁴ But the NORSO group’s impact was not limited to their actions in Norway, it can also clearly be seen through their contributions to the success of the Jedburgh missions. Many Allied military leaders did not value the OSS at the beginning of the war, as their missions made an impact, their value cannot be ignored, “Patton said that the OSS did not shorten the war by a ‘goddamn minute.’ Yet Oistad read that 20,000 German troops were killed or captured when the main Allied units from

the north and south joined in central France, setting the trap. Oistad argues that surely Patton used OSS reports that located German units during his sweep through France.”⁸⁵ The OGs’ contribution, when compared to that of large troop divisions, could be as effective, under the right circumstances, for less risk and less cost, “Leif Eide said they were in contact with Germans every day, and the OGs had more than their share in killing or capturing them with only three OG casualties.”⁸⁶

The idea that 24 men could prevent the return of 150,000 German troops is almost absurd. Operation RYPE did not destroy Grana Bridge, but the damage they did along the way exponentially justifies their presence, and saved lives on both sides as the war reached its end.

³⁶ A.B. Krongard, quoted in Lulushi, A. “Donovan’s Devils: OSS commandos behind enemy lines—Europe, World War II.” (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2016), vii

³⁷ William E. Colby, quoted in Heimark, B.H. “The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II.” (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), xi.

³⁸ Ibid. 1.

³⁹ Ibid. xxiii.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 7.

⁴¹ Lulushi, A. “Donovan’s Devils: OSS commandos behind enemy lines—Europe, World War II,” 65.

⁴² Ibid. 69.

⁴³ Ibid. 70.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 70.

⁴⁵ “Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Legend of the Jedburghs.” (Central Intelligence Agency: 2015).

⁴⁶ Ibid. and Mendelsohn, J. (Ed.). “Covert warfare : intelligence, counterintelligence, and military deception during the World War II era.” (Vol. 4). (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 1.

⁴⁷ Lulushi, A. “Donovan’s Devils: OSS commandos behind enemy lines—Europe, World War II,” 155.

⁴⁸ Mendelsohn, J. (Ed.). “Covert warfare : intelligence, counterintelligence, and military deception during the World War II era.” (Vol. 4), Chronological Summary.

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- ⁴⁹ William E. Colby, quoted in Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II," xi.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 5.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.* 5.
- ⁵² *Ibid.* 6.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.* 7.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 7.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 11,13.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 18.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 61.
- ⁵⁸ "Coordinator of Information, 1941," 3. "Coordinator of Information, 1941." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The President's Secretary's File (PSF), 1933-1945. Box 128, 3. Primary Document.
- ⁵⁹ Center for the Study of Intelligence. "William Colby and the NORSO Group." (Central Intelligence Agency: Washington D.C.). Image.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 64.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.* 67.
- ⁶² Colby, W. E. "OSS Operation Norway: Skis and Daggers." Central Intelligence Agency. Web, 55.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.* 72.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 72
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 74
- ⁶⁶ "Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Legend of the Jedburghs." Central Intelligence Agency.
- ⁶⁷ Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II," 77.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 62. Quote from Lt. Glen Farnsworth.
- ⁶⁹ "Silver Star Recipient Maj. William Colby, USA, Special Operations Branch." OSS Society. Image.
- ⁷⁰ Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II," 61.
- ⁷¹ "Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Legend of the Jedburghs." Central Intelligence Agency.
- ⁷² Quoted in Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency," 189.
- ⁷³ Lulushi, A. "Donovan's Devils: OSS commandos behind enemy lines—Europe, World War II," 59.
- ⁷⁴ Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II," 107.
- ⁷⁵ "Coordinator of Information, 1941," 7. Primary Document.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 107.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 90.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.* xiv.
- ⁷⁹ Colby, W. E. "OSS Operation Norway: Skis and Daggers," 56.
- ⁸⁰ Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II," 53.

⁸¹ Ibid. 80.

⁸² Ibid. 80.

⁸³ William E. Colby, Heimark, B.H. "The OSS Norwegian Special Operations Group in World War II," xii.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 107.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 55.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 55.

Chapter 4: Switzerland

Planning Operation SUNRISE

“Switzerland is now, as it was in the last war, the one most advantageous place for the obtaining of information concerning the European Axis powers.”—William Donovan⁸⁷

Negotiations surrounding Operation SUNRISE began on March 8, 1945.⁸⁸ When they realized defeat in Italy was imminent, General Wolff and other SS officers hoped to save German lives and save Italian history and art by negotiating surrender, rather than having to enforce a scorched-Earth policy as they retreated back to Germany. Wolff’s men also oversaw the mountains that held essential paths leading to Germany and beyond.⁸⁹ These would be valuable as the Allies continued to move toward Germany. The determining factor would be time, as all parties knew an Allied invasion was imminent and fast approaching.⁹⁰ Once the Allied force landed, such a surrender plan would be impossible.

After several talks at locations along the Swiss-Italian border, close enough to hide the fact that Wolff was not at his post, Wolff travelled to Germany to enlist the help of General Kesserling in convincing the remaining General stationed in Italy, General Vietinghoff, to support the surrender. Kesserling agreed. Surrender looked promising, until Himmler noticed that General Wolff moved his family into territory that he himself controlled. Himmler called to tell him the move was imprudent, and that he “...had taken the liberty of correcting the situation.”⁹¹ This meant that Wolff would be under suspicion and closely watched by the SS, knowing his family’s lives were at stake. Wolff played the last card in his hand and decided to tell Himmler that he was negotiating in order to separate the Americans from the Russians. Then Wolff was told to report to Berlin.⁹²

As all of this was occurring, Dulles was watching and reporting back. He requested officials be sent to facilitate the surrender if necessary, and continued to utilize his contacts in the Italian resistance to observe the situation. Then President Roosevelt died, and Truman decided maintaining wavering good relations with the Russians was a primary priority, and Truman felt the SUNRISE negotiations jeopardized this. On April 21, 1945, while awaiting Wolff's return from Berlin, Dulles received an order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to break off all negotiations with German emissaries.⁹³ Dulles explains this action further in his account of Operation SUNRISE:

“But little did I realize from the brief references in the cable to ‘complications’ which had arisen with the Russians, that Moscow had accused President Roosevelt of double-dealing in the Italian surrender talks, that this had occasioned the bitterest verbal exchange the United States had yet had with Moscow, and that Stalin had beclouded the President’s last days with his false charges which Roosevelt told Stalin he considered to be ‘vile misrepresentations.’”⁹⁴

Surrender on a Precipice

“Time after time the scheme came right to the edge of breakdown or disaster, but in the end SUNRISE succeeded, bringing about an early end to the Italian campaign in late April 1945—and saving hundreds if not thousands of lives.”—Center for the Study of Intelligence⁹⁵

Resigning himself to the operation's failure, Dulles suddenly received a call from the Italian resistance, saying that Wolff was on his way with Lieutenant Colonel Schweinitz on behalf of Vietinghoff to Switzerland to sign the "...capitulation of all German forces—Wehrmacht and SS—in Northern Italy."⁹⁶ In the words of Dulles, "To say I was in a predicament was to put it mildly."

Dulles had a decision to make, “Even to see the Germans would be a clear violation of instructions. Yet I was convinced that the Joint Chiefs would never have directed breaking off contact if they had know that the German envoys were already on their way to surrender.”⁹⁷ He decided to radio back for guidance and proceed by slightly stalling the negotiations, but assuming they would move forward.

As he waited for a reply, Dulles discovered how Wolff ingeniously escaped the wrath of Himmler. He carried with him a letter from his ally, German Ambassador to Italy, Rudolf Rahn, that implied the surrender negotiations were to achieve objectives set by Hitler himself, and action against Wolff would require answering to Hitler.⁹⁸ When Himmler seemed to waiver, Wolff insisted they go to speak with Hitler, and Himmler retreated asking not to accompany him.⁹⁹ When Wolff met with Hitler, he explained his failure to report back was as to provide Hitler with plausible deniability.”¹⁰⁰

While Dulles continued to wait for orders, his team intercepted a message from Himmler to Wolff ordering that no negotiations take place.¹⁰¹ Wolff responded by saying, “What Himmler has to say now makes no difference.”¹⁰² On April 27, three cables arrived to Dulles marked “TRIPLE PRIORITY,” which is the highest priority. This cable reversed all of the previous stop orders.¹⁰³ The final negotiations took place at Caserta, and the surrender was to go into effect on May 2, 1945 at 2:00 PM Central European Time.¹⁰⁴ It would soon be discovered that Hitler committed suicide the very same day.¹⁰⁵

All seemed settled when Dulles got word that the Swiss border had been closed. This trapped the signing German generals in Italy, who were now in danger because they were considered traitorous by German forces for surrendering. He quickly used his contacts to create a path for them.¹⁰⁶ The Allies needed confirmation that all German parties in Italy were enforcing surrender before hostilities could cease, and the final concerns would be relieved by communications from Wolff relayed by a German-

speaking OSS radio operative that Dulles had hidden on Wolff's staff a few weeks earlier.¹⁰⁷

A Profile: Allen Dulles

"Allen Dulles was born to high affairs of state."—Center for the Study of Intelligence¹⁰⁸



Illustration 4.1: Picture of Allen Dulles¹⁰⁹

Allen Dulles began his career in intelligence in WWII by serving as a COI station chief on the 36th floor of the Rockefeller Center in New York.¹¹⁰ Dulles was sent to Bern, Switzerland to set up an intelligence network, thus keeping a finger on the pulse of Europe. He made connections of every nationality and developed agents ranging from American journalist Mary Bancroft to German officers. Code-named Agent 110, he

would act as the station chief in Bern from 1942-1945.¹¹¹ He was born in New York, went to Princeton, and then became a lawyer after working for the U.S. Foreign Service.¹¹² He very much matched the typical gentleman-spy stereotype that was often assigned to members of the OSS.

After successfully operating in Switzerland for the majority of the war, Dulles would establish and oversee the new OSS Station in Germany.¹¹³ His time in the CIA as DCI following WWII is marked by considerable cooperation with his brother John Foster Dulles who served as Secretary of State at the same time. He oversaw highpoints in the development of the U-2 plane and the Corona satellite, and also presided over the creation of Radio Free Europe, and incidents including the Bay of Pigs.¹¹⁴

Dulles' OSS contribution shaped the way the Allies approached Europe in WWII. Without his efforts, the war would have likely been much longer and with greater loss of life.

Context

“Could there be an orderly German surrender, or would we be left with chaos and a vacuum of power in those parts of Europe left by the retreating Nazi Armies? From reports reaching us, it was clear that when the German military defenses finally crumbled, Hitler hoped to drag all of Europe down with him.”—Allen Dulles¹¹⁵

Negotiating surrender was a massively risky situation. The Allies could not pass up such an opportunity, though wary of the German officers. If word of the negotiation got out, Russia would not be happy with U.S. actions, threatening an already rocky

partnership. General Wolff and the other SS officers negotiating surrender would likely be killed if word of their negotiations made it back to Germany. Dulles needed to know the offer of surrender was genuine, and that there was support at the highest levels before he could move forward.

One of the most essential elements of the risk/gain analysis in this case is that Dulles tested General Wolff by asking for the release of two of the highest-level prisoners in Italy.¹¹⁶ A decision to release of these prisoners would not be made lightly. Wolff's decision to do so showed Dulles that working with Wolff would be worth the high risk, because of the possibility of such a high gain, "I then decided that it was worth the gamble to see Wolff myself, in full recognition of the fact that considerable risk was involved. It would probably be the first meeting to discuss peace between a commanding German officer and an Allied official since the war began."¹¹⁷

Success

"We have found in all our work that the communications man often is the key to the success of a mission."—William Donovan¹¹⁸

Success in this mission was two-pronged. Minimize losses of people and resources in Italy, and maintain good relations with Russia. Each could not be accomplished without the other. And the unconditional surrender of German forces would very easily accomplish both of these objectives.

Intelligence collection and dissemination is also successful, as Dulles gathered the information of a potential surrender, he cultivated it and asked relevant questions, and he reported relevant information to the decision-makers, thereby convincing them that action

was required. When new information presented itself in the form of the surrender proposal after he had been ordered to cease negotiations, he re-evaluated, reported back to the decision-maker, and operated in what he believed to be their best interests while awaiting further instructions. He was able to collect information that gave his policy-makers “decision advantage,” successfully fulfilling his role of intelligence officer.

At first glance, it looks as if General Wolff did most of the heavy lifting. But without the consistent support and management of Dulles, he would not have had the stability and commitment to see through the surrender. Dulles and his team managed quietly from the background, the early version of a CIA Case Officer. He facilitated conditions favorable to his preferred outcome, and accurately identified and acted upon vital hinge points in a developing situation.

Reward

“Despite the unconditional surrender policy, higher authority in Washington allowed Allen Dulles to meet with SS general Karl Wolff, who had secretly offered to broker a surrender of German forces in Italy.”—Center for the Study of Intelligence¹¹⁹

Behaviors that were clearly rewarded in this case study are strong judgment and consistency. Throughout his time in Bern, Dulles had proved he had good intuition and produced results that his policy-makers directed. When it became necessary for him to stand up against orders and recommend a different course of action, they trusted his judgment. He gained credibility and used it exactly when he needed to, establishing a precedent of deferring to the person on the ground. Without such confidence, success is much less likely.

The outcome of surrender was also obviously rewarded. The Allies proved trustworthy and consistent throughout the negotiations, seen by how Dulles actually carried the authority he represented, and how they protected the negotiators and helped them escape a dangerous situation in Italy after signing. This consistency by Allied forces gained valuable credibility that would save lives on both sides in later negotiations.

Impact

“Countless thousands of parents would bless were they privileged to know what you have done.”—Brigadier General John Magruder¹²⁰

The importance of this operation is nuanced. Without a surrender of German forces in Italy, the war would have extended by months at least. It was clear that the tide was turning in favor of the Allied forces, but Hitler and Germany still had several strongholds they intended to fight for until no choice was left.

This victory was just as much about the territory the Allies gained and the troops they prevented from fighting as it was about the blow to the morale Nazi Germany and Hitler’s grand strategy. The idea that German generals would break with Hitler and give up crucial territory to the Allies signaled the death knell of Nazi Germany. Victory in Europe would shortly follow.

⁸⁷ William Donovan, quoted in Miller, S. “Agent 110: an American spymaster and the German resistance in WWII.” (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2017), 8.

⁸⁸ Ibid. xvii.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 198.

⁹⁰ Dulles, A.W. “The secret surrender, part I.” (Central Intelligence Agency: Harpers Magazine, Web), 46.

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- ⁹¹ Ibid. 47
- ⁹² Ibid. 48
- ⁹³ Dulles, A. W.. "The secret surrender, part II." (Harper's Magazine, Web, 1966), 261.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid. 261-262.
- ⁹⁵ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency." (Central Intelligence Agency: Web, 2017) 7.
- ⁹⁶ Dulles, A. W. "The secret surrender, part II," 262.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid. 262.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid. 263.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid. 263.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 270.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid. 271.
- ¹⁰² Ibid. 271.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid. 271.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 273.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 274.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 274.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 276.
- ¹⁰⁸ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency." Central Intelligence Agency, 7.
- ¹⁰⁹ Garthoff, D.F. "Fifth DCI, Allen Welsh Dulles" In *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the US Intelligence Community*. (Center for the Study of Intelligence: 2012). Image.
- ¹¹⁰ Miller, S. "Agent 110: an American spymaster and the German resistance in WWII," 6.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid. xx.
- ¹¹² Ibid. xvii.
- ¹¹³ Ibid. 252.
- ¹¹⁴ "A Look Back ... Allen Dulles Becomes DCI." (Central Intelligence Agency: Web).
- ¹¹⁵ Dulles, A.W. "The secret surrender, part I," 38.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid. 41.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid. 43.
- ¹¹⁸ "GERMANY SUNRISE, 16,107." (Central Intelligence Agency: Primary Document, Web), 25.
- ¹¹⁹ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency." Central Intelligence Agency, 7.
- ¹²⁰ Brigadier General John Magruder, quoted in Miller, S. "Agent 110: an American spymaster and the German resistance in WWII," 249.

Chapter 5: Burma

Morale Operations (MO)

“The process of creating black propaganda is subtle, not heroic, tricky, not courageous, and yet in the right hands its cumulative effect can be devastating.”—Ann Todd¹²¹

With never more than 120 Americans, Detachment 101 operated on the ground in Burma, one of few OSS outposts in the Pacific Theater.¹²² They “gathered tactical intelligence, rescued downed fliers, and attacked the enemy when and where he was vulnerable.”¹²³ Detachment 101 was a unit focused on Morale Operations (MO):

“The Morale Operations Branch (MO) split from SO in 1943 to perform the “black” propaganda mission left behind in OSS when COI had been split the previous year. “Black” propaganda was supposed to look like it came from Germans or Japanese who were disgruntled with the war. It was intended to lower the morale of Axis troops and increase civilian resistance to the regimes in Berlin and Tokyo.”¹²⁴

It is difficult to narrow Detachment 101’s operations to a single mission, as the trial and error within their operation is what made them so effective. But for the purposes of this report, the mission overview will limit itself to two operations, to be referred to in this report as Operation Black Mail and Reimaging Surrender.

Operation Black Mail

“But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation.”—William Donovan¹²⁵




Illustration 5.1: OSS Black Mail Production Process¹²⁶

Over 500 Japanese postcards were intercepted on the eve of the battle at Myitkina, and they would serve to inspire Betty McIntosh to devise a plan of getting black MO into the Japanese Mainland.¹²⁷ This was not a completely new idea, as the Soviets and British had similar operations in different theaters, with the technique being described as, “...extremely indifferent, often containing no obvious political propaganda.”¹²⁸

Betty and her Detachment 101 compatriot, Bill, devised two main themes for the postcards, “...the [Imperial Japanese Army] in Burma was underequipped and being

defeated; U.S. bombers passed overhead daily to mass for bombings of Japan, and soldiers were unsettled by rumors of strikes on the home islands. Underlying the message: The war is lost.”¹²⁹ The success of this operation hinged on the believability of the new postcards, dependent largely on the OSS officers’ understanding of Japanese culture. Detachment 101 slipped the altered mail into the Japanese mail system, “Mission accomplished... Every reason to believe material will reach its destination.”¹³⁰ Soon after Betty and her team would acquire a stack of letters from the Japanese mainland to soldiers at the front, and the process would be repeated.¹³¹

Operation Gold-Dust: Reimagining Surrender

“...there are no grave crews assigned to count the doubts and troubles planted in men’s minds that can make them lose the will to fight.”—Betty McIntosh¹³²

The largest issue surrounding Japanese surrender was the prejudice and perceptions on both sides. The Allied forces believed the Japanese could not and would not surrender. And if the Japanese were able to overcome deep-seeded cultural bias against surrendering, the Japanese did not believe the Allies would honor their surrender. With both sides expecting a trick, achieving surrender would be difficult.

Having spent time with the Japanese, Betty McIntosh knew there must be a way to culturally accommodate surrender, and after considerable debate, she and her team realized that orders would overcome anything.¹³³ Thus, if the Japanese soldier received an order that surrender was acceptable if certain conditions are met, he would be able to do so while maintaining his honor. Betty decided that developing a convincing message would require input from actual Japanese soldiers.

Betty and teammate Bill then travelled to a camp, Red Fort, in search of Japanese POWs.¹³⁴ Through luck and fate, they found a prisoner who had been a middle school classmate of Bill in Japan, Mr. Okamoto.¹³⁵ Okamoto embraced the surrender idea, and joined the team.¹³⁶ Code-named Operation Gold-Dust, they perfected the order and disseminated through mailbags, placement them on dead couriers, and airdrops. A copy was even picked up by the War Office “white propagandists” who believed the order was real and published it as well.¹³⁷ White propaganda accidentally picking up black propaganda is sometimes called “drinking our own bathwater.”

A Profile: Elizabeth “Betty” P. McIntosh

“Never again would I feel so alive, so completely engaged in something I know would never come around again.”—Betty McIntosh¹³⁸




Illustration 5.2: Betty McIntosh's Identification Card, with her Married Name.¹³⁹

Before the war, Betty McIntosh lived and worked in Hawaii. Even before the war, she did everything she could to be a good reporter and seek out adventure. Experiencing Pearl Harbor, she helped in the hospitals, wrote about her experiences, and decided she wanted to do more. OSS recruiters sought her out because of her language skills, and she quickly found her place in the OSS.¹⁴⁰

McIntosh embodies the characteristics of the OSS and the personality essential to success. Her creativity and thoughtful understanding of culture and context helped her succeed in the OSS. She was determined to succeed and was not afraid of danger. A journalist who happened to speak Japanese, she was not trained to be a spy, but had skills she developed for her new trade.

Context

“The immediate goal is not winning but rather not losing.”—Ann Todd¹⁴¹

The risk/gain analysis within MO operations is unique. First, there is a low risk to force. In MO, significantly fewer lives are at risk than in traditional warfare. Betty’s mission was by no means easy, and Detachment 101 was purposely stationed within enemy territory and ahead of the Allied front, so they did see their fair share of risk, but the individual missions hinged on developing plans, creating postcards and leaflets to be delivered. So only those involved in dissemination of material faced a direct threat while executing these operations.

Second, risk to mission was minimal. Failure is considerably less costly in these MO operations. The Japanese soldiers expected attempts to confuse and lower morale. If

the mission failed, they could try again with a different approach. While they would need to maximize limited materials, the mission itself would not be compromised by failure.

Success

“In MO work, we must not restrain our imaginations. Out of twenty wild schemes, there might be one that would really work—and save lives.”—Betty McIntosh¹⁴²

As with all MO operations, success is often intangible. But evidence of the success of Operation Gold-Dust found its way back to Betty and her team quickly, “Word filtered back from the field: an increasing number of Japanese were reportedly feigning unconsciousness, and a growing number of those captured agreed to let the Red Cross send their names back to Japan. The most gratifying news was that the Japanese who surrendered to Detachment 101 were carrying the leaflets.”¹⁴³

Betty and her team did not need to win a battle. The results of their work would not be immediate. But their goal was to change the average Japanese soldier’s perception on surrender. This was success because when and if he was captured, the battle might end sooner, and lives on both sides could be saved, rather than fruitlessly fighting to the death.

Operation Black Mail had even less demonstrable success. Success within this mission was to chip away at a seemingly insurmountable obstacle of surrender so that later negotiations would fare better, especially on the mainland, which heretofore had been untouchable.

“Their job was to bend all their creative energies to destroying the morale of the Japanese soldier, as well as his family back home, infecting both with defeatism

and a burning desire to end the war. The goal was to deceive and trick the enemy into surrendering, thereby saving many lives on both sides.”¹⁴⁴

Reward

“MO had its own unique requirements, first and foremost a willingness to toil at something for which there would be no rewards, not even intangible ones.”—Ann Todd¹⁴⁵

It was difficult for the administration in D.C. to understand the importance of Detachment 101’s operations in Burma. Betty even wrote herself, “When the man with the military mind hammers on his desk and demands a set of figures to prove what MO did in Burma, no one, not even the Japs themselves can produce anything concrete for the Washington records.”¹⁴⁶ They operated so independently that behaviors and outcomes to be rewarded would mostly be within the unit. However, Detachment 101 eventually received a Presidential Unit Citation, so by the end of the war, their efforts would be rewarded.¹⁴⁷

Creativity and cultural understanding were rewarded in Detachment 101. That is why they were chosen by the OSS and stationed there. Teamwork was another rewarded behavior. Both of these operations were successful not because of an individual, but because of a team tackling a problem together and pooling all of their resources and cultural understanding, even if Betty had a sizeable influence.

Impact

“The only beaches stormed are the minds of an invisible enemy.”—Ann Todd¹⁴⁸

As mentioned multiple times, success and impact are hard to measure in MO. Its impact can most clearly be seen through its growing position of relevance throughout the war. MO operations gained credibility with each barely perceptible success, and by the end of the war, many of its opponents began to see its value:

“Eventually MO’s early critics came to value its services, which included rumors about Hitler’s health and sanity, vast quantities of subversive leaflets, stickers, and slogans, and fake German newspapers and radio broadcasts (featuring, for instance, Marlene Dietrich singing “Lilli Marlene”). By the end of the war, MO and its companion civilian and military agencies had convinced policymakers in Washington that modern wars need to be fought in the “psychological” as well as military and economic arenas.”¹⁴⁹

The future of MO operations most directly translates to the concept of “winning the hearts and minds.” John F. Kennedy discusses the importance of this concept in success in Latin America, “Perhaps most significant of all is a change in the hearts and minds of the people — a growing will to develop their countries.”¹⁵⁰ Lyndon Baines Johnson reintroduced the strategy as winning the hearts and mind two decades later describing Vietnam, “So we must be ready to fight in Viet-Nam, but the ultimate victory will depend upon the hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there. By helping to bring them hope and electricity you are also striking a very important blow for the cause of freedom throughout the world.”¹⁵¹

Psychological warfare cannot be ignored in modern conflict. “Winning the Hearts and Minds of the populace” would be included in the Army and Marine Corps revised “Counterinsurgency Field Manual” in 2006.¹⁵² And it is reintroduced by General Stanley McChrystal in 2009, “What I’m really telling people is the greatest risk we can accept is

to lose the support of the people here... If the people are against us, we cannot be successful. If the people view us as occupiers and the enemy, we can't be successful and our casualties will go up dramatically."¹⁵³ While each of these leaders and conflicts approached winning hearts and minds differently, and to varying degrees of success, its continuing presence represents its relevance.

This is more than just convincing people. It is most effective when serving to change perspectives and amplifying truths. What this case study examined took place in the jungles of Burma, but today ripples run from PSYOPS to social media. While it is impossible to measure the corrosive effects of MO operations on the perspectives of the Japanese soldiers, without these operations the loss of life would have likely been much higher. Detachment 101 measured the risk and the possibility of success made it worth it, aiding the Allies in winning the war more quickly, just as such risks are taken to reduce losses in modern conflict. And their most powerful weapon of truth maintains its position even today.

¹²¹ Todd, A. "Operation Blackmail: one woman's covert war against the Imperial Japanese Army." (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 4.

¹²² Center for the Study of Intelligence. "OSS Exhibition Catalogue." (Central Intelligence Agency: Web), 20.

¹²³ Ibid. 20.

¹²⁴ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency." (Central Intelligence Agency: Web, 2017), 6.

¹²⁵ "Coordinator of Information, 1941," 7.

¹²⁶ Bergin, B. "Inside the OSS: An Interview With Elizabeth P. McIntosh." (Warfare History Network: 2018). Image.

¹²⁷ Todd, A. "Operation Blackmail: one woman's covert war against the Imperial Japanese Army," 79.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 79.

¹²⁹ Ibid. 79.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 81.

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- ¹³¹ Ibid. 81,
- ¹³² Ibid. 103.
- ¹³³ Ibid. 98.
- ¹³⁴ Ibid. 100.
- ¹³⁵ Ibid. 101.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid. 101.
- ¹³⁷ Ibid. 103
- ¹³⁸ Betty McIntosh, quoted in Todd, A. "Operation Blackmail: one woman's covert war against the Imperial Japanese Army," xii.
- ¹³⁹ Makely, J. "Women of the CIA." (NBC: 2013). Image.
- ¹⁴⁰ Ibid. 38-39.
- ¹⁴¹ Ibid. 4.
- ¹⁴² Betty McIntosh, quoted in Todd, A. "Operation Blackmail: one woman's covert war against the Imperial Japanese Army," 47.
- ¹⁴³ Ibid. 103.
- ¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 40.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid. 58.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 103
- ¹⁴⁷ Center for the Study of Intelligence. "OSS Exhibition Catalogue," 20.
- ¹⁴⁸ Todd, A. "Operation Blackmail: one woman's covert war against the Imperial Japanese Army," 5.
- ¹⁴⁹ "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," Central Intelligence Agency, 6.
- ¹⁵⁰ Dickinson, E. "A Bright Shining Slogan." (Foreign Policy: Web, 2009).
- ¹⁵¹ Johnson, L.B. "Remarks at a Dinner Meeting of the Texas Electric Cooperatives, Inc." (The American Presidency Project: Web, 1965).
- ¹⁵² Dickinson, E. "A Bright Shining Slogan."
- ¹⁵³ Keck, K. "U.S. must win Afghan hearts and minds, commander says." (CNN: Web, 2009).

Chapter 6: China

A Road Less Travelled

“We were treated by everyone very well and I hope that we have laid a good foundation here. I know they like the U.S.A. more now and know more about it. “ – Ilia Tolstoy¹⁵⁴



Illustration 6.1: Tolstoy and Dolan in Tibet¹⁵⁵

In China’s fight against Japan, a connecting route from India for supplies was absolutely necessary. When Japanese forces cut-off use of the Burma Road, Chinese forces could only receive minimal Allied supplies delivered by a dangerous flight path over the Himalayan Mountains, a route later nicknamed the “Hump.”¹⁵⁶

Ilia Tolstoy and Captain Brooke Dolan were OSS officers chosen to solve this problem. They would seek to find a new route through “hidden country” and to do so, they would need the permission of the 7-year-old Dalai Lama.

Arriving in Tibet, they were welcomed and treated very gracefully, receiving the special honor of being allowed to ride their horses up to the Dalai Lama’s residence.¹⁵⁷ Of the Dalai Lama, Tolstoy said the following, “His Holiness was seated cross-legged, a high-peaked yellow hat on his head. We were immediately impressed by his young but stern face and not at all frail constitution. His cheeks were a healthy pink.”¹⁵⁸




Illustration 6.2: The Young Dalai Lama¹⁵⁹

Then began the traditional gift-giving, “Tolstoy proceeded through the tradition of offering gifts to the Dalai Lama—bread and butter followed by an image of Buddha, a religious book, and a chorten (a Buddhist reliquary). Then, for the first time in history, he made direct contact between the Dalai Lama and the President of the United States by passing a letter written by FDR to the young leader.”¹⁶⁰ The letter from FDR is recorded below:

“Washington, July 3, 1942.

Your Holiness: Two of my fellow countrymen, Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, hope to visit your Pontificate and the historic and widely famed city of Lhasa. There are in the United States of America many persons, among them myself, who, long and greatly interested in your land and people, would highly value such an opportunity.

As you know, the people of the United States, in association with those of twenty-seven other countries, are now engaged in a war which has been thrust upon the world by nations bent on conquest who are intent upon destroying freedom of thought, of religion, and of action everywhere. The United Nations are fighting today in defense of and for preservation of freedom, confident that we shall be victorious because our cause is just, our capacity is adequate, and our determination is unshakable.

I am asking Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to convey to you a little gift in token of my friendly sentiment toward you.

With cordial greetings [etc.]

Franklin D. Roosevelt¹⁶¹

It is interesting to note that Roosevelt took special care to acknowledge and address the Dalai Lama in his religious position rather than his political position, anticipating the conflict the situation could cause with China if mishandled.¹⁶² They

ultimately received permission to access the route and continue their travels, reportedly the first such permission in 22 years.¹⁶³

They would travel for 5 months to arrive at their destination and complete the route.¹⁶⁴ Dolan actually recorded pieces of their journey on film, which can be accessed in certain archives.¹⁶⁵

A Profile: Brooke Dolan

““Before leaving here for Philadelphia, Mr. Dolan said he would gladly return to Tibet, which he regarded as ‘one of the finest countries in the world.’”—The New York Times¹⁶⁶




Illustration 6.3: Tolstoy, Dolan, and a guide¹⁶⁷

Brooke Dolan was an explorer before he became an OSS officer. He had completed several expeditions to China and had even travelled to Tibet. He was known for the specimens of animals he collected for museums, especially “exceedingly rare high-altitude Asian mammals and birds,” many of which are still on display today.¹⁶⁸

Dolan is an excellent example of an OSS officer recruited for his skill set. Without his prior knowledge and experience from travelling through Asia, his mission would have been much harder. He found a way to continue researching and exploring while also defending a country he loved. Unfortunately, he died in China in August 1945, just before the end of the war at the age of 35.¹⁶⁹

Context

“This office, therefore, requests that the State Department should instruct the head of its diplomatic mission in New Delhi, India, to expedite the obtaining of a permit from the British authorities in India for Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to enter Tibet, by way of India, and to be allowed freedom of travel in Tibet in so far as the British are able to grant it without the necessity of returning to India.”—William Donovan¹⁷⁰

This operation involved many pitfalls. It would be difficult to cultivate a new relationship with the isolated Tibet without offending China. However, the need for supplies was desperate, and the supplies would considerably improve conditions for the Chinese forces, so the calculus was made that it was worth the risk.

This mission was given to the OSS because a unique solution was needed to a unique problem. The journey would be difficult. Tolstoy and Dolan faced the extreme

context of the unknown. Unknown allies, unknown enemies, and an unknown path lay in front of them.

Success

“While the route was never employed during the war—a diplomatic crisis prevented its use, and planes continued to fly “the hump” across the Himalayan mountains—Tolstoy and Brooke made history, bridging two cultures that before had never formally met.”—

Hillary Parkinson¹⁷¹

The crucial point in this operation was meeting with the Dalai Lama. That meeting alone would determine success. Without his approval, they would not have been able to travel through Tibet. Therefore the mission was largely a diplomatic mission.

Ironically, the route that Tolstoy and Dolan found would ultimately not be used by military forces. This does not, however, make this mission a failure, “While the route was never employed during the war—a diplomatic crisis prevented its use, and planes continued to fly “the hump” across the Himalayan mountains—Tolstoy and Brooke made history, bridging two cultures that before had never formally met.”¹⁷²

Reward

“This mission is of strategic importance and we hope will prove of long term value in the furtherance of the war effort in the Asiatic theatre.”—William Donovan¹⁷³

The behaviors that Dolan and Tolstoy exhibited in order to be chosen for the mission were the same behaviors that were ultimately rewarded. Dolan’s sense of adventure and exploration helped him make contacts in their journey and travel efficiently. Tolstoy’s diplomatic prowess allowed him to gain the trust of the Tibetan by writing to Donovan in order to acquire radios that they wanted and needed.¹⁷⁴

These agents would be sent on to other missions in their specialties having gained the trust of Donovan and FDR. Though the outcome of the route was not the solution, beginning a positive diplomatic relationship with Tibet would serve to facilitate better communication in the future.

Impact

“The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitute what is called total war.”—William Donovan¹⁷⁵

The impact of this mission was small compared to many of the other case studies in this report. This mission was chosen to represent individuals who accomplished what many thought was impossible, and whose individuality was representative of the culture of the OSS. Though the initiation of relations between the U.S. and Tibet and the creation of the route may not have been utilized by operations in WWII, this operation laid the

groundwork for later CIA operations in the region and U.S. foreign policy. The time horizon of this mission was long reaching, as were many other OSS operations in WWII.

WWII was not won in a single elaborate mission. It was won through a series of small missions, such as this one, adding up until the pressure could only result in enemy capitulation; these missions that would lay the foundation for the future of foreign policy.

¹⁵⁴ Smith, R. H. "OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency." (Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd, 1972), 255.

¹⁵⁵ "Story 83: Collecting in Asia" In *200 years. 200 Stories*. (The Academy of Natural Sciences of Drexel University: Web).

¹⁵⁶ Parkinson, H. "The OSS and the Dalai Lama." *Pieces of History*. (National Archives: Web, 2011).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ "The ten-year-old Dalai Lama who greeted Long Riders Tolstoy and Dolan in 1942." In *Across Tibet from India to China*. (Long Riders' Guild). Image.

¹⁶⁰ Parkinson, H. "The OSS and the Dalai Lama."

¹⁶¹ "President Roosevelt to the Dalai Lama of Tibet." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1942, CHINA. Document 524. 103.91802/687. (Primary Document: Web.)

¹⁶² Goldstein, Melvyn C. "The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War." (Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 8 no. 3, 2006), 145-164.

¹⁶³ Parkinson, H. "The OSS and the Dalai Lama."

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ "Story 83: Collecting in Asia" In *200 years. 200 Stories*.

¹⁶⁶ "EXPLORER RETURNS WITH TIBET FAUNA." Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. (1936, Feb 16). (New York Times (1923-Current File): Web).

¹⁶⁷ "Count Tolstoy and Captain Dolan with Gurkha on their way across Tibet." ." In *Across Tibet from India to China*. (Long Riders' Guild). Image.

¹⁶⁸ "Story 83: Collecting in Asia" In *200 years. 200 Stories*.

¹⁶⁹ "CAPT. BROOKE DOLAN, EXPLORER, HYUNTER, 35." Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. (1945, Aug 24). (New York Times (1923-Current File): Web.)

¹⁷⁰ "The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Secretary of State." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1942, CHINA. Document 522. 103.91802/687. (Primary Document: Web).

¹⁷¹ Parkinson, H. "The OSS and the Dalai Lama."

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ “The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Secretary of State.”

¹⁷⁴ Smith, R. H. “OSS: the secret history of America’s first central intelligence agency,” 254.

¹⁷⁵ “Coordinator of Information, 1941,” 3.

CONCLUSION

“We have come to the end of an unusual experiment. This experiment was to determine whether a group of Americans constituting a cross section of racial origins, of abilities, temperaments and talents could meet and risk an encounter with the long-established and well- trained enemy organizations....”—William Donovan¹⁷⁶

These case studies explored different missions and examined the characteristics of individual OSS officers in order to identify elements and characteristics of success. The OSS was born in an extreme context, which would shape the organizations that became its legacy and the individuals who would become its life-blood, especially in the CIA. As it attempted to implement its mission in peacetime, the CIA would inherit the culture and risk tolerance that emerged from the OSS in WWII, embodying similar characteristics in strengths and weaknesses.

Chapter 7: A Legacy that Still Echoes

Consequences of an Extreme Context

“The answer is simple. The CIA is no aberrant mutation of ‘Donovan’s Dreamers’; it is in many ways the mirror image of OSS.”—R. Harris Smith¹⁷⁷

Though the legacy of the OSS left ripples in organizations from the State Department to Special Forces, the legacy is most clearly reflected within the CIA. Indelibly shaped by experiences and a risk tolerance developed in WWII, the CIA is predisposed to certain mistakes and successes. A risk tolerance developed from the extreme environment of war resulted in a risk prone approach, costly in peacetime. But this same inheritance also allowed the CIA to attract and cultivate innovative and critical thinkers who can continue to achieve the impossible. The organization’s greatest strength in bold and independent officers can also be its greatest weakness.

President Truman disbanded the OSS on September 20, 1945, and its most successful sections would be distributed to other government departments.¹⁷⁸ Truman’s order to Donovan is shown in Appendix D. Soon after, the beginning of the Cold War would demonstrate that intelligence collection was still needed, so the White House would establish the National Intelligence Authority that included a Central Intelligence Group, “These were stopgap measures that proved inadequate substitutes for OSS. The following year, Congress provided for the creation of a Central Intelligence Agency.”¹⁷⁹

Skills and operational methods developed in wartime would suddenly be the tool kit of a peacetime organization. Former OSS officers would staff the new CIA. The same people would be doing the same jobs, just under a different title outside of the extreme circumstances of WWII, “CIA officials who ‘had been in the OSS during World War II

and had worked with the resistance in Europe and Asia' were responsible for planning the ill-fated invasion of Cuba. In Southeast Asia and elsewhere, former OSS men who had once aided underground partisans became leading experts on counterinsurgency and the suppression of left-wing rebellions.”¹⁸⁰

The CIA's willingness to pursue nearly impossible missions was inevitably accompanied by a willingness to accept extreme risk that was less defensible in a time of peace:

“Even more fundamental was the CIA's inherited justification for clandestine political operations unrelated to espionage and intelligence analysis. There had been no doubt as to the ethics of OSS foreign interventionism in the course of the battle against fascism. Yet CIA received, as a matter of unquestioned right, the same mantle of morality. The most notorious CIA-fomented coups in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East were, technically speaking, only extensions of Donovan's mandate for political warfare. The secret service remained the same—only the world had changed.”¹⁸¹

While this may be true, it is important to note that the CIA only undertakes covert action operations as directed and also approved by the executive branch, often bearing the blame in failure and rarely receiving the credit in success. This was especially true in the Bay of Pigs where senior levels of the Executive Branch, which approved the operation, took little responsibility. But the CIA does bear the responsibility of appropriately evaluating and communicating the risks in the decision-making process, and the decision-maker cannot make an accurate decision without this information.

The organizational culture of the OSS had the unmistakable imprint of the “Glorious Amateurs,” both good and bad. Organizationally, the configuration would mirror that of the OSS; “CIA inherited from OSS the crucial Donovan principle of merging Secret Intelligence and Special Operations in the same organization. The

functional titles changed to Foreign Intelligence and Covert Action but the theory was the same: to centralize all clandestine operations in a single bureaucracy.”¹⁸²

Replicating Success Today

“We were not afraid to make mistakes because we were not afraid to try things that had not been tried before.”—William Donovan¹⁸³

One of the most essential elements of success within both the OSS and the CIA is a developed credibility, allowing policy makers to trust of the judgment of those on the ground. Officers defer to the policy-maker, but the policy-maker cannot make effective decisions and take effective action without trusting the operators on the ground. The process is at its weakest when this trust is strained.

Measures of risk developed in the extreme context of war, would need to find their place in peacetime intelligence operations, but the CIA also learned from many of the lessons the OSS had already worked through. Donovan’s determination, Colby’s fearlessness, Dulles’ understanding of people, McIntosh’s creativity, Dolan’s passion, and the characteristics of so many other OSS officers reflect in the CIA today. The CIA will continue to make new mistakes as they try to move impossible situations. Embracing its resourceful and self-motivating spirit, individuals in the CIA would be trained to take on the most complex issues, finding a solution in situations deemed impossible.

As taught by those who came before, these descendants of the OSS would make the calculus of risk to determine what losses could be worth the success. And risk calculation will always be a key issue. The OSS was given the hard tasks, with little chance of success; the CIA is often given the same. Without individuals willing to take

the risk and make mistakes, there will not be individuals who are able to take the risks to achieve the greatest successes. Individuals at the CIA operate with a risk tolerance and foreign policy set by the executive branch. The legacy of the OSS created an organization that preserved a “can do” spirit. A common phrase at the CIA, “you’re smart, figure it out,” can only be successful within appropriate risk parameters set by the highest levels of the Executive Branch. But in order to fully utilize the CIA and its resources, the President must continually re-evaluate and define that risk tolerance. Risk can be reduced, but never fully eliminated. Situations require action in the midst of that risk, and in order for the individuals of the CIA to independently act when necessary, they need clearly defined parameters of risk.

The legacy of the OSS will continue to echo in the halls of the George Bush Center for Intelligence and in the operations of the CIA for years to come, as they continue to collect and analyze information to protect Americans. To close, Donovan summarized of efforts of the OSS in a memo as it was being disbanded at the end of the war, “At all times I ask you to bear in mind that the Office of Strategic Services was created as a war agency. It had, and it has now, no other mandate. It was created solely to hasten the defeat of our enemies. That job is done.”¹⁸⁴ The CIA carries on that mission today.

¹⁷⁶ “The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency.” (Central Intelligence Agency: Web, 2017), 11.

¹⁷⁷ William Donovan, quoted in Smith, R. H. “OSS: the secret history of America’s first central intelligence agency.” (Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd, 1972), 361.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.* (364)

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.* (365)

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.* (362)

¹⁸¹ *ibid.* (362)

¹⁸² *ibid.* (361-362)

¹⁸³ William Donovan, quoted in Lulushi, A. "Donovan's Devils: OSS commandos behind enemy lines—Europe, World War II." (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2016), viii.

¹⁸⁴ Center for the Study of Intelligence. "OSS Exhibition Catalogue." (Central Intelligence Agency: Washington D.C. Web), 38.

APPENDICES

Appendix A- Donovan's COI Proposal

Appendix B- Operation SUNRISE Memo

Appendix C- Excerpts from Dulles Commendation File

Appendix D- Truman Disbands OSS

Appendix E- CIA Credo

Appendix A- Donovan's COI Proposal¹⁸⁵

MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION

Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. Modern warfare depends upon the economic base -- on the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and performance of the industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural production and upon the character and efficacy of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the strength of the attack and the resistance of the defense. Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do men and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied by the present day army exacts an equally wide and deep network of operative lines. The "depth of strategy" depends on the "depth of armament."

The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitute what is called total war. To anticipate enemy intention as to the mobilization and employment of these forces is a difficult task. General von Bernhardi says, "We must try,

by correctly foreseeing, what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to gain an advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on the field of battle. That is what the future expects us to do."

Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking in effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain (or in some cases have obtained), relative to the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the economic and military resources of those enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information is inadequate. It is true we have intelligence units in the Army and the Navy. We can assume that through these units our fighting services can obtain technical information in time of peace, have available immediate operational information in time of war, and, on certain occasions, obtain "spot" news as to enemy movements. But these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the future. And we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans laid down for the spring of 1942.

We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our Government, documents and memoranda concerning military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a knowledge both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive results.

Critical analysis of this information is as presently important for our supply program as if we were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is unimaginable that Germany would engage in a \$7 billion supply program without first studying in detail the productive capacity of her actual and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that she displays such a mastery in the secrecy, timing and effectiveness of her attacks.

Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect, either directly or through existing departments of Government, at home and abroad, pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character

and strength of their armed forces, their internal economic organization, their principal channels of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their neighbors or allies.

For example, in the economic field there are many weapons that can be used against the enemy. But in our Government, these weapons are distributed through several different departments. How and when to use them is of vital interest not only to the Commander-in-Chief but to each of the departments concerned. All departments should have the same information upon which economic warfare could be determined.

To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized, trained research officials in the relative scientific fields (including technological, economic, financial and psychological scholars), is of determining influence in modern warfare.

Such analysis and interpretation must be done with immediacy and speedily transmitted to the intelligence services of those departments which, in

some cases, would have been supplying the essential raw materials of information.


But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation. In this attack, the most powerful weapon is radio. The use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent upon accurate information. From this information, action could be carried out by appropriate agencies.

The mechanism of this service to the various departments should be under the direction of a Coordinator of Strategic Information, who would be responsible directly to the President. This Coordinator could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director of FBI, the Directors of the Army and Navy Intelligence Service, with corresponding officials from other Governmental departments principally concerned.

The attached chart shows the allocation of and the interrelation between the general duties to be


discharged under the appropriate directors. Much of the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy and other departments of the Government, and it will be seen from the chart that the proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department of the Government.

The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is to constitute a means by which the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions could be based.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "William J. Donovan". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "W" and a long, sweeping underline.

William J. Donovan

Washington, D. C.



Appendix B- Operation SUNRISE Memo¹⁸⁶

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy. It is a summary of a more comprehensive report which has been communicated to AFHQ.

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.

Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not questioned provided such surrender be "honorable". All three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his own initia-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Appendix C- Excerpts from Dulles Commendation File¹⁸⁷

Page 2.

6 A few of the more spectacular achievements credited to Mr. Dulles are FIRST reports on the following:

As early as August 1943 he warned that the enemy had set up an experimental laboratory at Peenemunde, northern Germany, for the testing of a so-called rocket bomb. Only after repeated insistence on Mr. Dulles' part was the British Air Ministry convinced that such experiments were actually in progress, and on pin points furnished by him, the RAF carried out the first important raid on Peenemunde two weeks later.

Months before any action was taken by Allied Air forces, Mr. Dulles forwarded the information that rocket-bomb installations were being erected ~~at~~ ^{in the} Pas de Calais. Time and time again he repeated and elaborated on this information.

The flooding of Belgian and Dutch coastal areas was reported by Mr. Dulles long before similar information came in from other sources.

Reports on the damage inflicted by Allied Air forces as a result of raids on Berlin and other German, Italian and Balkan cities were forwarded by Mr. Dulles within two or three days of the operations.

He maintained a constant flow of accurate information regarding the location and plans for possible movements of such German warships as the Schornhurst, von Tirpitz and Gneisenau.

✓ Mr. Dulles intercepted the orders for the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon and reported this information promptly to the proper services. Well in advance of the operation, he reported information from a high source, to the effect that the Italian fleet could be depended upon to surrender a large part of its vessels.

7 He built up for the United States an enormous prestige among leading figures of occupied nations presently taking refuge in Switzerland, and exerted a strong influence upon satellite governments through contacts with dissatisfied elements. Through his efforts these latter elements have been, in a number of instances, induced to return to their respective countries for the purpose of launching revolts against Quisling regimes. On the other hand, by his diplomacy and highly efficient management of delicate situations, he has promoted an astounding amount of good

SECRET

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3 October 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington,
D. C.

THRU : The Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT : DULLES, ALLEN - - - Recommendation for award of
the Distinguished Service Medal for exception-
ally meritorious service to the Government in
a duty of great responsibility.

1. It is recommended that Mr. Allen Dulles, head of the United States under-cover operations in Switzerland, be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

2. On a mission for the Office of Strategic Services, Allen Dulles, arrived in Switzerland on or about 11 November 1942. He assembled a staff consisting of four assistants, two secretaries and a code clerk. With this nucleus, supplemented from time to time by American aviators interned in Switzerland, Mr. Dulles organized what became, within a very brief span, the foremost unit for espionage in the annals of under-cover operations conducted in connection with the United States Army.

3. Within a year an intelligence system consisting of sixteen (16) distinct chains and employing more than three hundred (300)

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

Dulles, Allen (cont)

3 October 1944

Mr. Dulles intercepted the orders for the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon and reported this information promptly to the proper services. Well in advance of the operation, he reported information from a high source, to the effect that the Italian fleet could be depended upon to surrender a large part of its vessels.

7. He built up for the United States an enormous prestige among leading figures of occupied nations presently taking refuge in Switzerland, and exerted a strong influence upon satellite governments through contacts with dissatisfied elements. Through his efforts these latter elements have been, in a number of instances, induced to return to their respective countries for the purpose of launching revolts against Quisling regimes. On the other hand, by his diplomacy and highly efficient management of delicate situations, he has promoted an astounding amount of good will among the Swiss people and the government of Switzerland itself. His relationship with the Swiss, both from a military and political point of view, has proved mutually beneficial to the end that there have been many instances of complete cooperation in the gathering of intelligence.

8. For the past two years Mr. Dulles has carried out his assignment under extremely hazardous conditions. Although under constant observation by enemy agents, he was able to perform the duties assigned to him in a manner reflecting great credit to himself and the service. According to the reports of American aviators, who,

~~SECRET~~

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Dulles, Allen (cont)

3 October 1944

while interned in Switzerland worked as code clerks, radio operators and at other duties under his direction, Mr. Dulles, by his conduct and bearing at all times, set an unparalleled example of courage and devotion to duty. No personal sacrifice has ever been too great for him to make in the accomplishment of his objectives.

9. Mr. Dulles' entire service to the Government has been honorable.

10. This recommendation is based on my personal observation and knowledge since November, 1942, and on the records of this office.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

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- 5 -

Appendix D- Truman Disbands OSS¹⁸⁸

ARCANIS-SIMUM

I.R.I.S.

Ultimum

-2-

My dear General Donovan:

I appreciate very much the work which you and your staff undertook, beginning prior to the Japanese surrender, to liquidate those wartime activities of the Office of Strategic Services which will not be needed in time of peace.

Timely steps should also be taken to conserve those resources and skills developed within your organization which are vital to our peacetime purposes.

Accordingly, I have today directed, by executive order, that the activities of the research and analysis branch and the presentation branch of the Office of Strategic Services be transferred to the State Department. This transfer, which is effective as of Oct. 1, 1945, represents the beginning of the development of a coordinated system of foreign intelligence within the permanent framework of the government.

Consistent with the foregoing, the executive order provides for the transfer of the remaining activities of the Office of Strategic Services to the War Department; for the abolition of the Office of Strategic Services; and for the continued orderly liquidation of the office without interrupting other services of a military nature the need for which will continue for some time.

I want to take this occasion to thank you for the capable leadership you have brought to a vital wartime activity in your capacity as Director of Strategic Services. You may well find satisfaction in the achievements of the office and take pride in your own contribution to them. These are in themselves great rewards. Great additional reward for your efforts should lie in the knowledge that the peacetime intelligence services of the government are being erected on the foundation of the facilities and resources mobilized through the Office of Strategic Services during the war.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have today signed an executive order which provides for the transfer to the State Department of the functions, personnel and other resources of the research and analysis branch and the presentation branch of the Office of Strategic Services. The order also transfers the remaining activities of the Office of Strategic Services to the War Department and abolishes that office. These changes become effective Oct. 1, 1945.

ARCANIS-SIMUM

ARCANISSIMUM

I.R.I.S.

Ultimum

-3-

The above transfer to the State Department will provide you with resources which we have agreed you will need to aid in the development of our foreign policy, and will assure that pertinent experience accumulated during the war will be preserved and used in meeting the problems of the peace. Those readjustments and reductions which are required in order to gear the transferred activities and resources into State Department operations should be made as soon as practicable.

I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and co-ordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity. This should be done through the creation of an inter-departmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval. This procedure will permit the planning of complete coverage of the foreign intelligence field and the assigning and controlling of operations in such manner that the needs of both the individual agencies and the Government as a whole will be met with maximum effectiveness.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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ARCANISSIMUM

Appendix E- CIA Credo¹⁸⁹

Approved For Release 2008/10/02 : CIA-RDP90B01370R000600840029-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CREDO

We are the Central Intelligence Agency.

We produce timely and high quality intelligence for the President and Government of the United States.

We provide objective and unbiased evaluations and are always open to new perceptions and ready to challenge conventional wisdom.

We perform special intelligence tasks at the request of the President.

We conduct our activities and ourselves according to the highest standards of integrity, morality and honor and according to the spirit and letter of the law.

We measure our success by our contribution to the protection and enhancement of American values, security and national interest.

We believe our people are the Agency's most important resource. We *seek* the best and work to *make them* better. We subordinate our desire for public recognition to the need for confidentiality. We strive for continuing professional improvement. We give unfailing loyalty to each other and to our common purpose.

We look to our leaders to stimulate initiative, a commitment to excellence, and a propensity for action; to reward and protect us in a manner which reflects the special nature of our responsibility, our contribution, and our sacrifices; and to promote among us a sense of mutual trust and shared responsibility.

We derive our inspiration and commitment to excellence from the inscription in our foyer: "And Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

Approved For Release 2008/10/02 : CIA-RDP90B01370R000600840029-3

¹⁸⁵ "Coordinator of Information, 1941." (3-9)

¹⁸⁶ "Office of Strategic Services - Reports - Donovan, William J., September 22, 1944-April 10, 1945." (p. 105)

¹⁸⁷ "Allen W. DULLES." (p. 3-6)

¹⁸⁸ "Office of Strategic Services, April-June 1944." (p. 139)

¹⁸⁹ "Central Intelligence Agency Credo." (Central intelligence Agency: 1984. Web)

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